[1]王愚,达庆利.基于企业成长函数的激励机制[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2001,31(4):117-120.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2001.04.027]
 Wang Yu,Da Qingli.Incentive Mechanism Based on Enterprise’s Growth Function[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2001,31(4):117-120.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2001.04.027]
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基于企业成长函数的激励机制()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
31
期数:
2001年第4期
页码:
117-120
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2001-07-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Incentive Mechanism Based on Enterprise’s Growth Function
作者:
王愚 达庆利
东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 210096
Author(s):
Wang Yu Da Qingli
College of Economic Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China)
关键词:
委托-代理 激励机制 企业系统
Keywords:
principal-agency incentive mechanism enterprise system
分类号:
F224.32
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2001.04.027
摘要:
在现代企业组织实践中,激励方案的发展呈现多样化和长期化的特点,对此,传统的委托-代理模型无法做出合理的解释.本文分析了现代企业系统的复杂性和目标的多样性,提出企业作为一个有机的系统,单纯追求利润最大化的不合理性,并且建立了基于企业成长函数的委托-代理模型,模型的目标函数包括短期利润和长期利润两部分,求解该模型证明了采用长期合同的解帕累托优于采用单期合同的解,从而为现代企业新的多样化的激励机制提供了理论依据.
Abstract:
The development of incentive scheme has the characteristic of diverse and long-term in present management of organizations. The traditional principal-agency model can’t provide reasonable answer. This paper studies the complexity and diversity of modern enterprises, points out that it is irrational for an enterprise to pursue short-term profit merely, and provides a principal-agency model based on the enterprise’s growth function. The objective function of the model includes two parts, short-term profit and long-term profit. It is proved that the solution with long-term contracts is Pareto and is superior to the solution with short-term contracts.

参考文献/References:

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[3] Fama E.Agency problems and the theory of the firm.Journal of Political Economy,1980,88:288~307
[4] Holmstrom B,Milgrom P.Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives.Econometrica,1987,55:303~328
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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介:王愚,男,1971年生,博士研究生.
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(79970093).
更新日期/Last Update: 2001-07-20