[1]石岿然.双寡头纵向产品差异化市场的演化博弈分析[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2004,34(4):523-528.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2004.04.023]
 Shi Kuiran,Xiao Tiaojun.Evolutionary game analysis of duopolistic market with vertical production differentiation[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2004,34(4):523-528.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2004.04.023]
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双寡头纵向产品差异化市场的演化博弈分析()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
34
期数:
2004年第4期
页码:
523-528
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2004-07-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Evolutionary game analysis of duopolistic market with vertical production differentiation
作者:
石岿然1 2 肖条军1
1 南京大学工程管理学院, 南京 210093; 2 南京工业大学理学院, 南京 210009
Author(s):
Shi Kuiran1 2 Xiao Tiaojun1
1 School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
2 School of Sciences, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009, China
关键词:
双寡头市场 纵向产品差异化 演化博弈论 演化稳定策略
Keywords:
duopolistic market vertical product differentiation evolutionary game theory evolutionary stable strategy
分类号:
F713.54
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2004.04.023
摘要:
基于一个具有非线性需求函数的纵向产品差异化模型,研究双寡头市场的演化稳定策略.考虑市场分别存在生产高质量产品和低质量产品的2家企业进行的两阶段博弈问题,企业在第1阶段选择策略变量(价格或产量),在第2阶段确定价格的高低或产量的大小. 通过博弈分析,证明了Cournot均衡为子博弈精炼纳什均衡.在此基础上建立了复制者动态系统,运用演化博弈方法讨论系统各平衡点的局部稳定性,得到了产量策略构成惟一演化稳定策略的结论.
Abstract:
Based on a vertical product differentiation model with nonlinear demand functions, the evolutionary stable strategy(ESS)in a duopolistic market in which a high quality firm and a low quality firm are involved is studied. In the first stage of a two-stage game, the firms choose their strategic variable, price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. The result that the Cournot equilibrium constitutes a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is obtained by game analysis. Also, the replicator dynamic system is built and the local stability of the fixed points is discussed from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory. Furthermore, the theorem that the quantity strategy is the unique ESS is proved.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70301014,70171028).
作者简介: 石岿然(1971—),男, 博士生; 肖条军(联系人),男,博士,副教授,xiaotiaojun@nju.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2004-07-20