[1]邓玉林,王文平,陈娟,等.基于风险偏好的知识型员工激励机制[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2005,35(4):624-627.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2005.04.028]
 Deng Yulin,Wang Wenping,Chen Juan,et al.Incentive mechanism of knowledge workers with risk preference[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2005,35(4):624-627.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2005.04.028]
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基于风险偏好的知识型员工激励机制()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
35
期数:
2005年第4期
页码:
624-627
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2005-07-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Incentive mechanism of knowledge workers with risk preference
作者:
邓玉林1 王文平1 陈娟1周卉2
1 东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 210096; 2 北京科技大学信息工程学院,北京 100083
Author(s):
Deng Yulin1 Wang Wenping1 Chen Juan1 Zhou Hui2
1 College of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
2 School of Information Engineering, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083, China
关键词:
知识型员工 风险偏好 激励机制 风险分担
Keywords:
knowledge workers risk preference incentive mechanism risk share
分类号:
F270
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2005.04.028
摘要:
基于知识型员工风险偏好的讨论,利用H-M扩展模型,分别研究了确定及不确定环境下知识型员工风险偏好与激励机制风险分担之间的关系,并利用收益成本法讨论了如何协调两者的冲突.研究表明:随着知识型员工风险规避程度的减小,激励机制应增加其风险分担; 企业可通过改变风险分担调节知识型员工的风险偏好,从而提高企业产出和知识型员工收入; 风险分担的改变具有上限,该上限取决于知识型员工能力和环境不确定性等因素.最后给出了案例分析.
Abstract:
Based on the discussion of risk preference of knowledge workers, the relation between knowledge workers’ risk preference and the risk share of incentive mechanism under certain and uncertain conditions was studied respectively using the extended H-M model. By use of income-cost approach the coordination of the conflict between both aspects was discussed. Results show that the incentive mechanism should increase its risk sharing with the decrease of risk aversion of knowledge workers, and enterprise can adjust the risk preference of knowledge workers by changing the risk share to improve the output of enterprise and income of knowledge workers. There is an upper limit of the change of the risk share, which depends on both the ability of knowledge workers and uncertainty of conditions. Finally, a case analysis is presented.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70001001).
作者简介: 邓玉林(1974—),男,博士生; 王文平(联系人),女,博士,教授,博士生导师,wpwang@seu.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2005-07-20