[1]杨勇,达庆利.基于最优脉冲控制的战略互补产品创新投资决策[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2005,35(6):958-962.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2005.06.028]
 Yang Yong,Da Qingli.Investment decision making in technology innovation of strategic complementary product based on optimal impulse control[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2005,35(6):958-962.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2005.06.028]
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基于最优脉冲控制的战略互补产品创新投资决策()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
35
期数:
2005年第6期
页码:
958-962
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2005-11-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Investment decision making in technology innovation of strategic complementary product based on optimal impulse control
作者:
杨勇 达庆利
东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 210096
Author(s):
Yang Yong Da Qingli
College of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
关键词:
最优脉冲控制 战略互补 不对称企业 实物期权
Keywords:
optimal impulse control strategic complimentary asymmetric enterprises real options
分类号:
F830.59
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2005.06.028
摘要:
应用最优脉冲控制理论将企业技术创新的实物期权和企业间的竞争影响纳入到一个统一的框架中,研究了不对称企业的战略互补产品的创新投资问题.将不对称企业的技术创新投资决策视为脉冲控制并求得在各种状态下企业的投资收益; 详细地分析了2个企业投资博弈中存在的2种均衡,即序列均衡和同时均衡,研究结果表明,均衡结果依赖于2个企业成本的不对称程度和创新产品的战略互补程度,进一步讨论了在序列均衡状态下跟随企业投资的期望执行时间; 最后,应用数值案例定量地给出了企业的投资临界值和相应的均衡结果,从而验证了理论分析结果.
Abstract:
Real options of investment in technology innovation and effect of competition between firms are combining into a unique framework using optimal impulse control theory. Investment decision making in technology innovation of cost asymmetric firms in presence of strategic complementary is studied. Firstly, investment decision in technology innovation of asymmetric firms are viewed as impulse controls. Value function under many conditions are derived. Then two equilibriums, sequential and simultaneous equilibrium, are analyzed in detail. The results demonstrate that the equilibriums depend on asymmetry among firms and strategic complementary. Expectant investment time of follower firm under sequential equilibrium is discussed. Finally, numerical techniques are employed to derive investment thresholds and equilibrium result. The findings are consistent with the theoretic results.

参考文献/References:

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[5] 杨勇,达庆利.不对称双寡头企业技术创新投资决策研究[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(4):95-99.
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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目: 高等学校博士学科点基金资助项目(20030286008).
作者简介: 杨勇(1973—),男,博士生; 达庆利(联系人),男,博士,教授,博士生导师,dql@public1.ptt.js.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2005-11-20