[1]石岿然,肖条军.基于演化博弈理论的企业组织模式选择[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,37(3):537-542.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.03.037]
 Shi Kuiran,Xiao Tiaojun.Organizational mode choice of firms based on evolutionary game theory[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2007,37(3):537-542.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.03.037]
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基于演化博弈理论的企业组织模式选择()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
37
期数:
2007年第3期
页码:
537-542
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2007-05-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Organizational mode choice of firms based on evolutionary game theory
作者:
石岿然12 肖条军2
1 南京工业大学经济管理学院, 南京 210009; 2 南京大学工程管理学院, 南京 210093
Author(s):
Shi Kuiran12 Xiao Tiaojun2
1 College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Technology, Nanjing 210009, China
2 School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China
关键词:
组织模式 复制者动态 演化均衡 国际贸易
Keywords:
organizational mode replicator dynamics evolutionary equilibrium international trade
分类号:
F713.54
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.03.037
摘要:
研究单一企业群体及两个企业群体进行产量竞争情形下,企业组织模式选择的演化问题.假定企业可以选择集中化模式或分散化模式,对于封闭经济情形,建立了单种群演化动态,并证明了当替代系数满足一定条件时,存在惟一的演化均衡.在此基础上,以所得的演化均衡为初始条件建立了两种群演化模型,研究了开放经济下企业同时进行国内和国际竞争时其组织模式的演化,理论分析和数值例子表明不存在稳定的内点演化均衡.通过比较不同贸易政策下的均衡产量和均衡利润,阐释了演化均衡的动态调整过程.
Abstract:
The evolutionary problems for organizational mode choice of firms where one population and two populations of firms compete in quantity are studied. The firms are assumed to choose either centralized mode or decentralized mode and the replicator dynamics of one population is presented under autarky. It is demonstrated that there exists a unique evolutionary equilibrium when substitute coefficient satisfies certain conditions. Furthermore, with the autarky evolutionary equilibria taken as initial conditions, the model of two populations is built to study the evolution of organizational mode under the environment that the firms compete at home and abroad. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples show that there is no stable interior evolutionary equilibrium. Finally, the dynamic process of evolutionary equilibria is illustrated by comparing the equilibrium output and equilibrium profit under different trade policies.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70301014,70571034,70671055)、江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(06SJB630008)、江苏省高校“青蓝工程”优秀青年骨干教师培养计划资助项目.
作者简介: 石岿然(1971—),男,博士,副教授,shikuiran@njut.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2007-05-20