[1]王安宇,司春林.基于关系契约的研发联盟收益分配问题[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,37(4):700-705.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.04.031]
 Wang Anyu,Si Chunlin.Profit-sharing of research and development alliances based on relational contracts[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2007,37(4):700-705.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.04.031]
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基于关系契约的研发联盟收益分配问题()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
37
期数:
2007年第4期
页码:
700-705
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2007-07-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Profit-sharing of research and development alliances based on relational contracts
作者:
王安宇 司春林
复旦大学管理学院, 上海 200433
Author(s):
Wang Anyu Si Chunlin
School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
关键词:
研发联盟 关系契约 绝对优势 相对优势
Keywords:
research and development alliances relational contracts absolute advantage comparative advantage
分类号:
F273.1
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.04.031
摘要:
在关系契约框架下研究研发联盟的收益分配问题.结果表明,研发联盟一次性合作的收益分配方案应遵循绝对优势原则,即合作各方应能够得到与自身贡献相匹配的合理收益; 而重复合作收益分配应遵循相对优势原则,即根据相对成本和相对效率确定收益分配率,应给予相对劣势成员比短期合作中更高的收益分配比例,虽然该比例仍低于相对优势成员.这些研究结论可用来修正研发联盟收益分配正式契约条款,有助于克服成员的背约冲动,维护研发联盟的长期稳定.
Abstract:
The profit-sharing problem of research and development alliances in the framework of relational contracts is discussed. The first finding is that partners in one-off cooperation should get reasonable amount of profit in proportion to their own contribution to the alliance, which is called the absolute advantage principle. And as for the repeated cooperation, the profit-sharing scheme should follow the comparative advantage principle in which the sharing rate is determined by the comparing result of relative cost and relative effectiveness. According to the principle, the relatively disadvantaged members should be given a higher sharing rate than they can get in one-off cooperation, although the rate is still lower than what the advantaged would get. Following these principles can prevent members from breaking the cooperative agreement and do benefit to the stability of the alliance.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502010).
作者简介: 王安宇(1973—),男,博士,讲师,aywang@fudan.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2007-07-20