[1]王文平,邓玉林,单海燕.基于重复博弈的集群企业间社会关系构建分析[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,37(4):721-725.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.04.035]
 Wang Wenping,Deng Yulin,Shan Haiyan.Analysis of social relationship construction between firms in cluster based on repeat game[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2007,37(4):721-725.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.04.035]
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基于重复博弈的集群企业间社会关系构建分析()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
37
期数:
2007年第4期
页码:
721-725
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2007-07-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Analysis of social relationship construction between firms in cluster based on repeat game
作者:
王文平 邓玉林 单海燕
东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 210096
Author(s):
Wang Wenping Deng Yulin Shan Haiyan
School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
关键词:
集群 社会关系 重复博弈 关系契约 自我实施约束 贴现率
Keywords:
cluster social relation repeat game relational contract self-restrict discount rate
分类号:
F27
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2007.04.035
摘要:
针对我国外生模式及混合内生模式集群中核心企业与依附企业间的主从支配关系,将核心企业与依附企业间的社会关系收益进行量化,讨论了核心企业与依附企业间的社会关系构建及维持的影响因素及内在机制.研究表明,核心企业与依附企业间的社会关系构建与维持取决于核心企业对双方社会关系价值的预期以及依附企业的市场价格; 核心企业依据依附企业的市场价格来分割双方的社会关系收益; 而依附企业可以通过提高自身的价值,获取更高的社会关系收益分割值,缔结和维持有利于自身和集群成长的社会关系.
Abstract:
Based on the principal and subordinate dominating relationships between core enterprises and accessorial enterprises in the ectogenous enterprises cluster and the mixed endogenous enterprises cluster of our country, the returns of social relationships between core enterprises and accessorial enterprises are quantified. The influencing factors of constructing and keeping social relations between core enterprises and accessorial enterprises are discussed. It is proved that constructing and keeping such social relations depend on the core enterprises’ expectation of the returns of social relations and the market price of accessorial enterprises. Core enterprises deal social relations with accessorial enterprises according to accessorial enterprises’ market price. So the accessorial enterprises can get larger partition of the return of social relations by raising their market price. And this will help the accessorial enterprises in constructing and keeping social relations which is good for their growing and the cluster’s development.

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70571013)、国家社会科学基金资助项目(05CYJ004)、 江苏省高校哲学社会科学资助项目(05SJD630041).
作者简介: 王文平(1966—),女,博士,教授,博士生导师, wpwang@seu.edu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2007-07-20