[1]方海燕,达庆利.双寡头市场中面向R&D产品的企业R&D策略[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2009,39(6):1258-1262.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2009.06.033]
 Fang Haiyan,Da Qingli.R&D strategies of firm facing on product R&D in duopoly market[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2009,39(6):1258-1262.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2009.06.033]
点击复制

双寡头市场中面向R&D产品的企业R&D策略()
分享到:

《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
39
期数:
2009年第6期
页码:
1258-1262
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2009-11-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
R&D strategies of firm facing on product R&D in duopoly market
作者:
方海燕12 达庆利1
1 东南大学经济管理学院, 南京 210096; 2 金陵科技学院商学院, 南京 210001
Author(s):
Fang Haiyan12 Da Qingli1
1 School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
2 Faculty of Business, Jinling Institute of Technology, Nanjing 210001, China
关键词:
古诺竞争 R& D产品 市场绩效 产业组织政策
Keywords:
Cournot competition product R& D(research and development) market performance industrial organizational policy
分类号:
F270
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2009.06.033
摘要:
为了研究企业的研究与开发(R&D)策略,建立了双寡头市场中面向R&D产品的两阶段博弈模型:第一阶段企业进行R&D投资以提高产品质量; 第二阶段企业在市场中进行古诺竞争.用逆向归纳法求出了4种R&D策略下的古诺-纳什均衡解.研究表明, R&D非合作策略与R&D卡特尔策略相比,从利润最大化角度考虑,企业应该选择R&D卡特尔策略; 在溢出效应较低且产品差异不大条件下,从产品产量与质量角度考虑,企业应选择R&D非合作形式; 在溢出效应较高且产品水平差异较大的条件下,R&D卡特尔更能推动产品质量、产量和企业利润的提高,并且可以改善社会总体福利,因此,企业应选择R&D卡特尔策略.在4种R&D策略中,从产品质量、产量、利润以及福利最大化角度考虑,研究联合体策略优于其他任何一种策略.
Abstract:
A two-stage game model is established in a differentiated duopoly market with product R&D(research and development)for researching firm’s R&D strategies: At stage 1 R&D expenditure is invested by the firms in order to enhance product quality, at stage 2 the quantity is set in a condition of Cournot competition. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium solutions are acquired with four R&D strategies by backward induction. Noncooperation R&D strategy is compared with cartel R&D strategy.It is shown that, compared with noncooperation R&D strategy, cartel R&D strategy should be selected as the cooperation form by the enterprise from the consideration of maximum enterprise profits. Under the condition that the spillover is weak and products are not too differentiated, noncooperation at both R&D stage and product marketing stage should be chosen through the perspectives of output and quality. Under the condition that the spillover is strong and products are very different, cartel R&D in the R&D stage should be chosen since it could promote product quality, output and enterprise profit, as well as social welfare. In the four R&D strategies which are compared in this paper, the RJV(Research Joint Venture)R&D strategy is slightly superior to any other form from the view of maximum quality, output, profit and welfare.

参考文献/References:

[1] d’ Aspremont C,Jacquemin A.Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with spillovers[J]. American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137.
[2] Suzumura K.Cooperative and noncooperative R&D in an oligopoly with spillovers[J].American Economic Review,1992,82(5):1307-1320.
[3] Kamien M,Muller E,Zang I.Research joint venture and R&D cartels[J].American Economic Review,1992,82(5):1293-1306.
[4] Brod A,Shivakumar R.Advantageous semi-collusion[J].Journal of Industrial Economics,1999,47(2):221-230.
[5] Petit M L,Sanna-Randaccio F.Endogenous R&D and foreign direct investment in international oligopolies [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000,18(2):339-367.
[6] 霍沛军,陈继祥,宣国良.双寡头R&D竞争与合作中的知识产权保护[J].上海交通大学学报,2001,35(6):938-942.
  Huo Peijun,Chen Jixiang,Xuan Guoliang.Intellectual property rights protection:R&D competition versus cooperation in duopoly[J].Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University,2001,35(6):938-942.(in Chinese)
[7] Ishii A.Cooperative R&D between vertically related firms with spillovers[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2004,22(8/9):1213-1235.
[8] Piga C,Poyago-Theotoky J.Endogenous R&D spillovers and locational choice[J].Regional Science and Urban Economics,2005,35(2):127-139.
[9] Leahy D,Neary J P.Symmetric research joint ventures:Cooperative substitutes and complements[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2005,23(5/6):381-397.
[10] 李忠,陈继祥.存在成果溢出和投资溢出下的研发组织分析[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2003,12(2):116-119.
  Li Zhong,Chen Jixiang.R&D organization analysis under output or investment spillover[J].China Systems Engineering Theory Methodology Applications,2003,12(2):116-119.(in Chinese)
[11] Symeonidis G.Comparing Cournot and Bertrand and equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with product R&D[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21(1):39-55.
[12] Motta M.Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1992,10(4):643-661.
[13] Symeonidis G.Cartel stability in advertising-intensive and R&D-intensive industries[J].Economics Letters,1999,62(1):121-129.
[14] Symeonidis G.Price and non-price competition with endogenous market structure[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,2000,9(1):53-83.
[15] Qiu L D.On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1997,75(1):213-229.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介: 方海燕(1963—),女, 博士生; 达庆利(联系人),男,教授,博士生导师.fhy2003bs.student@sina.com.
基金项目: 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20030286008).
引文格式: 方海燕,达庆利.双寡头市场中面向R&D产品的企业R&D策略[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2009,39(6):1258-1262. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2009.06.033]
更新日期/Last Update: 2009-11-20