[1]张建坤,陈森发,周雷.经济适用房准入管理政策的激励机制设计与实证分析[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2010,40(5):1115-1120.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2010.05.044]
 Zhang Jiankun,Chen Senfa,Zhou Lei.Incentive mechanism designing of access management policy for affordable housing and its case analysis[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2010,40(5):1115-1120.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2010.05.044]
点击复制

经济适用房准入管理政策的激励机制设计与实证分析()
分享到:

《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
40
期数:
2010年第5期
页码:
1115-1120
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2010-09-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Incentive mechanism designing of access management policy for affordable housing and its case analysis
作者:
张建坤1 陈森发2 周雷3
1 东南大学土木工程学院,南京 210096; 2 东南大学经济管理学院,南京 210096; 3 技术大学建筑信息研究所,格拉茨,奥地利
Author(s):
Zhang Jiankun1 Chen Senfa2 Zhou Lei3
1 School of Civil Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
2 School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
3 Institute of Building Information, Graz University of T
关键词:
机制设计 经济适用房 政策 信息非对称性
Keywords:
mechanism design affordable housing policy asymmetric information
分类号:
F293.3;F224.32
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2010.05.044
摘要:
就当前经济适用房认购对象出现错位; 部分申请者谎报、瞒报家庭收入骗取经济适用房购买权; 经济适用房准入政策不严密等状况,采用激励机制设计理论,通过对现行经济适用房准入管理政策的分析,构建激励相容的机制模型.在对北京市家庭进行实证分析的基础上,对现行经济适用房准入机制进行完善,并得出保证申请者真实申报前提下的政府最大效用值.政府在制定经济适用房准入政策时,不仅要准确把握政策目标,而且要深入了解在追求最大利益的个人理性驱使下,人们将选择怎样的行动,从而提高政策制定与调控的准确性.
Abstract:
In view of the dislocation problems of the access to affordable housing, that is, some applicants give false information or hide the truth about household income in order to gain the purchase right of affordable housing, a scientific and incentive compatibility mechanism model is built by analyzing the current admittance management policy of affordable housing based on the incentive mechanism theory. And then through the demonstration analysis of Beijing family, the government maximal utility value is got when the precondition of applicant’s truly applying is guaranteed. When the government makes policy, it should not only grasp the policy object, but also have a deep understanding of the driving of individual rationality for pursuing the best interests and what action people would choose. Thus the policy making and adjusting would be more accurate and scientific.

参考文献/References:

[1] 余东华.激励性规制的理论与实践述评——西方规制经济学的最新进展[J].外国经济与管理,2003,38(7),44-48.
  Yu Donghua.Review on incentive regulation in theory and practice-latest progress of western regulation economics[J].Foreign Economies & Management,2003,38(7),44-48.(in Chinese)
[2] 党曦明.激励机制设计理论及其应用[D].北京:北京邮电大学经济管理学院,2004.
[3] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店,2004.
[4] Benneworth P,Danson M.Confusing cluster:making sense of the cluster approach in theory and practice [J].European Planning Studies,2003,11(5):11-20.
[5] Palfrey T,Srivastava S.Mechanism design with incomplete information:a solution to the implementation problem [J].Journal of Political Economy,1989,97(3):668-691.
[6] 田国强.经济机制理论:信息效率与激励机制设计[J].经济学,2003,2(2):271-308.
  Tian Guoqiang.Economic mechanism theory:informational efficiency and incentive mechanism design[J].China Economic Quarterly,2003,2(2):271-308.(in Chinese)
[7] Waehrer K.Hazardous facility sitting when cost information is private:an application of multidimensional mechanism design [J].Journal of Public Economic Theory,2003,52(4):605-622.
[8] Bergemann D,Morris S.Robust mechanism design [J].Econometrica,2005,73(6):1771-1813.
[9] 刘峰.不完全信息、激励与机制设计理论——2007年度诺贝尔经济学奖评述[N].光明日报,2007-10-30(10).
[10] Laffont J-J,Martimort D.Mechanism design with collusion and correlation[J].Econometrica,2000,68(2):309-342.

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介: 张建坤(1963—),男,博士,副教授,zhang-jk@vip.163.com.
基金项目: 国家社会科学基金资助项目(10BJY042).
引文格式: 张建坤,陈森发,周雷.经济适用房准入管理政策的激励机制设计与实证分析[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2010,40(5):1115-1120. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2010.05.044]
更新日期/Last Update: 2010-09-20