[1]钟晓,陶军.分布式分级结构的用户路由行为模型[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2011,41(2):237-241.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2011.02.005]
 Zhong Xiao,Tao Jun.Distributed hierarchy routing behavior model[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2011,41(2):237-241.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2011.02.005]
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分布式分级结构的用户路由行为模型()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
41
期数:
2011年第2期
页码:
237-241
栏目:
计算机科学与工程
出版日期:
2011-03-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Distributed hierarchy routing behavior model
作者:
钟晓陶军
(东南大学教育部计算机网络和信息集成重点实验室, 南京 210096)
Author(s):
Zhong XiaoTao Jun
(Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Integration of Ministry of Education, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China)
关键词:
分级结构路由路由行为非原子路由Stackelberg博弈效用
Keywords:
hierarchy routing behavior routing behavior non-atomic routing Stackelberg game utility
分类号:
TP393
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2011.02.005
摘要:
为了减少Internet中用户自私的路由行为对网络性能的损害和避免低效路由的出现,针对Internet中用户不平等、分等级的角色,研究了非合作用户的路由行为模型.描述了Stackelberg路由博弈的行为框架(不同数目的领导者和跟随者),将Stackelberg博弈应用于分级用户的路由博弈行为模型.论证了Stackelberg均衡点的存在性和唯一性,并定量地讨论了均衡点上的路由向量; 最后,进一步讨论了在实际网络中“原子”和“非原子”路由博弈的问题,从而论证该模型的应用价值.
Abstract:
To reduce the damage to network performance from Internet users’ selfish routing behaviors and to avoid the emergence of inefficient routing, non-cooperative users routing behavior model is studied according to different and hierarchy roles of Internet users. After the framework of Stackelberg routing game with different leaders and followers is described, the Stackelberg game theory is applied to study routing game behavior model of hierarchy users. The existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium point are proved and the routing vector on equilibrium point is derived. Finally, the problems of “atomic” and “non-atomic” routing game are discussed and the application value of the model is demonstrated.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介:钟晓(1977—),女,博士生;陶军(联系人),男,博士,副教授 ,juntao@seu.edu.cn.
基金项目:江苏省自然科学基金资助项目(BK2010414).
引文格式: 钟晓,陶军.分布式分级结构的用户路由行为模型[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2011,41(2):237-241.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2011.02.005]
更新日期/Last Update: 2011-03-20