[1]陈斐,邓玉林,达庆利.基于展望理论的知识型员工激励机制[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2012,42(5):1016-1020.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2012.05.039]
 Chen Fei,Deng Yulin,Da Qingli.Incentive mechanism for knowledge workers based on prospect theory[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2012,42(5):1016-1020.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2012.05.039]
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基于展望理论的知识型员工激励机制()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
42
期数:
2012年第5期
页码:
1016-1020
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2012-09-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Incentive mechanism for knowledge workers based on prospect theory
作者:
陈斐12 邓玉林3 达庆利1
1 东南大学经济管理学院,南京 211189; 2 南京信息工程大学经济管理学院,南京 210044; 3 河海大学商学院,南京 210098
Author(s):
Chen Fei12 Deng Yulin3 Da Qingli1
1 School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China
2 School of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044,China
3 School of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098,China
关键词:
展望理论 效用函数 奖励与惩罚 挑战性目标
Keywords:
prospect theory utility function bonus and penalty challenge object
分类号:
F241
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2012.05.039
摘要:
基于展望理论研究了效用函数,同时利用委托代理理论分别研究了确定性环境和不确定性环境下知识型员工激励机制中奖励与惩罚的特征.研究表明:损失规避心理需要补偿,奖励与惩罚不具有对称性,惩罚优化了风险分担,少罚多奖具有更好的激励效果; 员工行动可观测且目标业绩等于知识型员工的能力水平时,可以实现泊累托最优; 挑战性目标与惩罚方式相结合的激励机制能促使知识型员工付出更多努力,提高企业产出水平,但惩罚方式也提高了企业的薪酬成本.最后给出了案例分析,论证了在知识型员工的激励实践中,通过设计挑战性目标业绩,同时结合惩罚方式的激励机制,可以利用知识型员工的损失规避心理,产生更好的激励作用.
Abstract:
The utility function based on prospect theory is studied, then using principal-agent theory, the properties of bonus and penalty for knowledge workers under certain and uncertain conditions are discussed, respectively. It is shown that the mind of loss aversion must be compensated; it is not symmetrical between bonus and penalty; penalty can optimize risk sharing; less penalty and more bonus present better incentive effect. The incentive mechanism of challenge object matching penalty can encourage knowledge workers to work harder and improve output, however, penalty also increases the cost of compensation. Finally, a case analysis is presented. In the motivation practice of knowledge workers, designing a challenge object in combination with penalty by using the loss aversion of knowledge workers can produce better incentive effect.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介: 陈斐(1981—),女,博士生,讲师; 达庆利(联系人),男,教授,博士生导师,dqlseunj@126.com.
基金项目: 中央高校科研基本业务费资助项目(20091323414)、江苏省高校哲学社会科学资助项目(2011JD63005)、河海大学人文社科基金资助项目(2084/408205)、河海大学科研启动基金资助项目(2084/4071135).
引文格式: 陈斐,邓玉林,达庆利.基于展望理论的知识型员工激励机制[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2012,42(5):1016-1020. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2012.05.039]
更新日期/Last Update: 2012-09-20