[1]成于思,李启明,袁竞峰.风险态度对建筑工程项目投标均衡策略的影响及对策[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2013,43(2):431-435.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.02.038]
 Cheng Yusi,Li Qiming,Yuan Jingfeng.Effects and countermeasures regarding risk attitude in construction procurement equilibrium[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2013,43(2):431-435.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.02.038]
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风险态度对建筑工程项目投标均衡策略的影响及对策()
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《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
43
期数:
2013年第2期
页码:
431-435
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2013-03-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Effects and countermeasures regarding risk attitude in construction procurement equilibrium
作者:
成于思李启明袁竞峰
东南大学土木工程学院, 南京210096
Author(s):
Cheng Yusi Li Qiming Yuan Jingfeng
School of Civil Engineering, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
关键词:
建设工程招投标 不完全信息博弈 风险态度 多属性拍卖
Keywords:
construction procurement incomplete information game risk attitude multi-attribute auction
分类号:
F724.59
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.02.038
摘要:
针对建筑工程项目招标市场上投标人超低报价中标现象,在现有的最低价格密封报价招标的理论模型基础上,考虑投标人风险态度因素,运用不完全信息博弈理论给出了投标人均衡报价函数.通过对均衡策略特性的研究得到风险态度不同可能导致成本较高的承包商中标.提出利用多属性拍卖模型解决低价中标带来的低效问题,研究了该模型下投标人的最优投标策略.通过算例给出了采用多属性拍卖机制的某工程项目招投标及评分过程,分析了模型参数对均衡结果的影响.研究表明,多属性招投标中,投标人根据成本参数和属性权重先确定非价格属性值后再决定报价,同时由于减少合同的不确定性,使得投标人偏向风险中性,并且有效改变了低价中标现象.
Abstract:
Aiming at the problem that the bidder wins the project with unrealistically low price in construction procurement market, the neutral risk-taking bidders in the first price sealed bid model are extended to the heterogeneous bidders. The equilibrium bid functions in the extended model are derived using game-theoretic analysis. It is concluded that the bid method with different risk-taking bidders has the potential to deliver the project to high cost contractor. Multi-attribute sealed-bid auction mechanism is proposed to overcome the problem of unrealistically low price winning. The corresponding equilibrium strategies are provided to testify the efficiency of the mechanism. Finally, the bidding and scoring process is presented through a construction project bidding case, and the influence of the model parameters on the bidding result is discussed. The research reveals that in multi-attribute auction non-price dimensions are chosen dependently on the weight and cost parameters and then bidding price is determined. This mechanism decreases the uncertainty of contract and changes the risk attitude of bidders to risk neutral to resolve the bidding problem.

参考文献/References:

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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介: 成于思(1983—),女,博士生;李启明(联系人),男,博士,教授,博士生导师,njlqming@163.com.
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(51178116,71001027)、江苏省高校研究生科技创新计划资助项目.
引文格式: 成于思,李启明,袁竞峰.风险态度对建筑工程项目投标均衡策略的影响及对策[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2013,43(2):431-435. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.02.038]
更新日期/Last Update: 2013-03-20