[1]路云,邓玉林,吴应宇,等.社会医疗保险基金委托代管的激励机制[J].东南大学学报(自然科学版),2013,43(6):1330-1334.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.06.036]
 Lu Yun,Deng Yulin,Wu Yingyu,et al.Incentive mechanism of insurance company running social medical insurance fund[J].Journal of Southeast University (Natural Science Edition),2013,43(6):1330-1334.[doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.06.036]
点击复制

社会医疗保险基金委托代管的激励机制()
分享到:

《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》[ISSN:1001-0505/CN:32-1178/N]

卷:
43
期数:
2013年第6期
页码:
1330-1334
栏目:
经济与管理
出版日期:
2013-11-20

文章信息/Info

Title:
Incentive mechanism of insurance company running social medical insurance fund
作者:
路云1邓玉林2吴应宇3花磊3
1东南大学公共卫生学院, 南京210096; 2河海大学商学院, 南京 210098; 3东南大学经济管理学院, 南京210096
Author(s):
Lu Yun1 Deng Yulin2 Wu Yingyu3 Hua Lei3
1School of Public Health, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
2Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China
3School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China
关键词:
社会医疗保险基金 年度最佳结余率 激励机制
Keywords:
social medical insurance fund yearly optimum balanced rate incentive mechanism
分类号:
C979
DOI:
10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.06.036
摘要:
研究了政府在医疗保险基金代管过程中对商业保险公司的激励机制.基于仿真计算讨论委托人产出函数为非线性时委托代理模型中的激励措施.结果表明,当外部风险低于阈值时,委托人应采用浮动收益法进行激励;当外部风险高于阈值时,委托人应采用固定收益和浮动收益相结合的方式进行激励.代理人的努力程度与其内部成本系数成反比;代理人所能忍受的外部风险阈值与其风险规避度成负相关关系.因此,委托人应当选择管理经验丰富、人员流动性低、资产规模大和财务状况稳健的商业保险公司进行基金代理,以保证在相同的激励成本条件下能够获得最大产出收益.
Abstract:
The incentive mechanism of an insurance company running a social medical insurance fund is discussed. By using the simulation method, incentives in a principal-agent model with a nonlinear principal production function are presented. Results show that variable compensation is preferred when the risk is below the threshold; otherwise, combining fixed compensation with variable compensation is recommended. The relationship between the agents effort and the intrinsic cost coefficient is inverse. The external risk threshold agent endured is negative correlation to the risk aversion. Therefore, the principal should choose the insurance company which has rich management experience, low staff mobility, large assets and a stable financial situation to obtain the maximum benefits.

参考文献/References:

[1] Aksha V. A study of PPP models for social health care insurance [R]. New Delhi, India: Centre for Public Policy Research, 2012.
[2] Holmstrom B, Milgrom P. Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives [J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(2): 303-328.
[3] Ecker J G, Kupferschmid M. A computational comparison of the ellipsoid algorithm with several nonlinear programming algorithms[J]. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 1985, 23(5): 657-674.
[4] Dempe S. Computing optimal incentives via bilevel programming[J]. Optimization: A Journal of Mathematical Programming and Operations Research, 1995, 33(1): 29-42.
[5] Cecchini M, Ecker J, Kupferschmid M,et al. Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 230(2): 364-373.
[6] 郭晓明.非线性成本函数条件下委托-代理模式研究[D].广州:暨南大学经济学院,2008.
[7] 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版, 1996:399-441.
[8] Kyle A S, Ouyang H, Xiong W. Prospect theory and liquidation decisions[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 129(1): 273-288.
[9] Demski J S, Fellingham J C, Lin H H. Useful additional evaluation measures[J]. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2008, 20(S1): 165-173.
[10] 陈斐,邓玉林, 达庆利.基于展望理论的知识型员工激励机制[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2012,42(5):1016-1020.
  Chen Fei, Deng Yulin, Da Qingli. Incentive mechanism for knowledge workers based on prospect theory[J]. Journal of Southeast University: Natural Science Edition, 2012, 42(5): 1016-1020.(in Chinese)

备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
作者简介: 路云(1978—),女,博士,讲师,luyunseu@163.com.
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103033)、江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(12GLC005).
引文格式: 路云,邓玉林,吴应宇,等.社会医疗保险基金委托代管的激励机制[J].东南大学学报:自然科学版,2013,43(6):1330-1334. [doi:10.3969/j.issn.1001-0505.2013.06.036]
更新日期/Last Update: 2013-11-20